The ceasefire agreement envisions an International Stabilization Force — made up of soldiers from Arab and Muslim-majority countries — that would vet, train, and support a new Palestinian police force while securing aid deliveries and preventing weapons smuggling. It is a central element of the security architecture for post-Hamas Gaza. There is one significant problem: no one is willing to command it against Hamas.
Countries being asked to contribute troops have insisted that any deployment be framed strictly as a peacekeeping mission. They have flatly refused to take part in the disarmament of Hamas — a task that could put their forces in direct confrontation with one of the most battle-hardened militant organizations in the region. Indonesia, which is training up to 8,000 soldiers for the force, confirmed its forces would not participate in disarmament.
The mandate of the stabilization force is not spelled out in detail in the ceasefire agreement — a deliberate ambiguity that allowed the deal to be signed but has created implementation difficulties that are now becoming apparent. Countries contributing forces need clarity about rules of engagement, command structures, and the boundaries of their mission before they will deploy.
There is also the question of armed groups allied with Israel operating in Gaza. Their presence alongside international forces creates potential for friction that contributing countries have flagged as a serious concern. Any stabilization force would need clear understandings about the activities of these groups in areas where international troops are operating.
As Trump’s Board of Peace held its first meeting Thursday, the stabilization force remained more concept than reality. Bringing it into existence requires resolving the mandate questions, securing final country commitments, establishing command arrangements, and creating the security conditions on the ground that would allow international troops to operate safely.
